Abstract is paper presents and discusses a range of counterexamples to the common view that quanti ers cannot take scope over epistemic modals. Some of the counterexamples raise problems for 'force modi er' theories of epistemic modals. Some of the counterexamples raise problems for Robert Stalnaker's theory of counterfactuals, according to which a special kind of epistemic modal must be able to scope over a whole counterfactual. Finally, some of the counterexamples suggest that David Lewis must countenance 'would' counterfactuals in which a covert 'would' scopes over the whole consequent of the counterfactual, including an overt 'might. '
still wants to raise the possibility that it is true, she might use an epistemic possibility modal like 'might' or 'could. ' Many theorists have taken these observations to support the thesis that a given epistemic modal simply "applies to assertions and indicates the extent to which the speaker is committed to the truth of the proposition" (B et al. , ) . For example, John Lyons writes that "Subjective epistemic modality is nothing other than … the locutionary agent's quali cation of his epistemic commitment" to the proposition expressed by the modal's complement (, ). Huw Price writes that "the distinctive feature of the meaning of utterances of the form 'It is probable that …' … [is] a matter of their having a distinct force, rather than a distinct sense" (a, ). And Janneke Huitink writes that "subjective may functions as a down-toner, which weakens that speech act into conjecture" (, ) . For convenience I call views in this family force modi er views.
Force modi er views straightforwardly explain how an epistemic modal attenuates the speaker's expressed commitment to its complement. eir advocates take this to be an important advantage over truth-conditional theories of epistemically hedged sentences. According to truth-conditional theories, in asserting 'Might φ' a speaker expresses full commitment to a modalized proposition, not attenuated commitment to the proposition that φ. is raises what Price calls "the con dence problem": how is it that a full belief in the proposition putatively expressed by, say, "It is  likely that q" always goes hand in hand with credence of . in the proposition that q simpliciter? Full beliefs and partial beliefs play such different roles in our doxastic lives that it is hard to see what could underwrite this connection (P b, ; see also F ,  and S , - and , -). But on a force modi er view, "It is  likely that q" simply expresses the proposition that q with an appropriately "down-toned" force. Force modi er views thus offer a straightforward account of the relation between a hedged assertion and the kind of doxastic state that that assertion expresses and is intended to instill. Force modi er views are also modest in the sense that they leave ordinary truth-conditional semantics largely untouched: the modal does nothing more than modulate the force with which the speaker asserts its complement. Just as an English speaker might use one kind of rising intonation to attenuate force non-semantically, according to force modi er views a non-semantic way for an English speaker to attenuate the force of certain assertions is to head them with 'it might be that, ' 'it is probable that, ' and so on.
Force modi er views are committed to WS because they hold that quanti ers operate at the level of semantic content and epistemic modals operate at a level that determines what's done with that content: epistemic modals in uence only the force with which a given proposition is expressed. But this separation is not tenable. Consider the differences between () and (), which wide-scopes the modal in ():
"Every moment you spend with your child could be the one that really matters" (R , xv-xvi) .
() It could be that every moment you spend with your child is the one that really matters.
() says that for any given moment you spend with your child, that moment could have a property that at most one moment could have: being the moment that really matters. e anomalous (), by contrast, says that it could be that every moment you spend with your child has a property that at most one moment could have. Similar examples are easy to nd. From a Russian language news site: How can we be sure that a particular use of a modal targets epistemic modality? Sometimes it is hard to say what other modal avor a modal might sensibly be used to target. It is implausible that the possibility modals in () and () target alethic, bouletic, circumstantial, deontic, dispositional, dynamic, jurisprudential, metaphysical, nomological, rational, or root modality. And there are also positive reasons to think these modals are epistemic. For example, a rough paraphrase of () is:
No moment you spend with your child can be known not to be the one that really matters.
Moreover, one might use () to object to a contrary assertion:
() A: e moment we walked into Disneyland was the one that really mattered. B: You don't know that. Every moment you spend with your child could be the one that really matters.
S  and  offer more examples. T  argues that 'each' can scope over epistemic modals, but that 'every' cannot. H  argues that quanti ers scope over epistemic modals only when the modal "depend[s] on accessible, quanti able evidence" (), and she too holds that 'every' "just cannot take scope over an epistemic modal" (; see also H ).
http://podrobnosti.ua/health////.html, accessed February , . Note that on one reading () says that every time you take cocaine could-given what you know at the time you take the cocaine-be your last. is reading is hard to reconcile with A 's claim that epistemic modals "… directly pick up the local evaluation time as a modal perspective" (). anks to Daniel Altshuler and Natalia Kondrashova for their judgments about this example.
()-B is a relevant, appropriate way to contest ()-A. But ()-B would be irrelevant as a response to ()-A if its 'could' did not target epistemic modality.
Here are two more examples. Eager to solve the crime, Watson infers that the thief must be the gardener. Holmes responds by pointing out aws in Watson's argument. He shows that the evidence establishes at most that someone here-they know not whom-is the thief. Holmes summarizes his objections by saying that
Given only what we can be certain of, no one here has to be the thief.
() simply isn't relevant as a response to Watson unless 'has to' is read epistemically. And again, wide-scoping the epistemic modal yields the wrong truth conditions. Finally, aer painting the ceiling I might use () to warn you to walk carefully. But I would not thereby commit myself to ().
() Almost every square inch of the oor might have paint on it.
() It might be that almost every square inch of the oor has paint on it.
And again, () can be a good way to contest a claim that the oor doesn't have paint on it. So (), (), (), and () all show that quanti ers can scope over epistemic modals. e rhetoric that I quoted earlier indicates that force modi er theorists take themselves to be wide-scopist about epistemic modals. But perhaps commitment to WS is not really essential to their views. What would a force modi er account that was not committed to WS look like? e difficulties with () are striking: the meaning of () is roughly that of a big disjunction of conjunctions, the conjuncts of which say, for each region that includes almost all of the squares, of each square in that region that that square might have paint on it. e force modi er theorist who abandons WS must explain how epistemic modals interact with quanti ers, in a way that vindicates this paraphrase. And so force modi er views that are not committed to WS cannot prescind from the details of the semantic interpretation function. Building on K  and , K  explores the idea that we can quantify into speech acts. But Kria argues that "disjunction is not a plausible combination of speech acts" () and that because "non-universal quanti ers, as e.g. most, also require disjunction as [a] basic operation … they are not suitable for quanti cation over speech acts" (). Indeed, he appeals to this restriction in explaining unrelated phenomena. So Kria's approach does not help the force modi er theorist with ().
. Conditionals
In Counterfactuals David Lewis argues against the conjunction of two principles: Conditional Excluded Middle: Either 'If it had been that φ, it would have been that  ψ' is true or 'If it had been that φ, it would have been that ¬ψ' is true.
Counterfactual Duality: 'If it had been that φ, it might have been that ψ' is true iff 'If it had been that φ, it would have been that ¬ψ' is false (, -; B & P ,  and B ,  are also advocates).
Conjoined, these principles efface the distinction between 'would' and 'might' counterfactuals: 'If it had been that φ, it would have been that ψ' and 'If it had been that φ, it might have been that ψ' get the same truth value (-). Here is the biconditional's surprising direction. Suppose that "If it had been that φ, it might have been that ψ" is true. By this and Counterfactual Duality it follows that "If it had been that φ, it would have been that ¬ψ" is false. By Conditional Excluded Middle either this or "If it had been that φ, it would have been that ψ" is true. So the latter is true. Robert Stalnaker endorses Conditional Excluded Middle, and so he must explain why Counterfactual Duality appears to be valid without committing himself to its validity. One might try to explain its apparent validity by holding that the 'might' in a 'might' counterfactual takes wide scope and is epistemic though the 'would' in a 'would' counterfactual is not epistemic. On this hypothesis, a speaker who asserts 'If it had been that φ, it might have been that ψ' would convey that it is epistemically possible for her that 'If it had been that φ, it would have been that ψ' is true, and hence (by Conditional Excluded Middle) that it is epistemically possible for her that 'If it had been that φ, it would have been that ¬ψ' is false. is would make it inappropriate for her to say 'If it had been that φ, it would have been that ¬ψ. ' And a speaker who asserts 'If it had been that φ, it would have been that ψ' would convey that it is not epistemically possible for her that 'If it had been that φ, it would have been that ¬ψ' is true, making it inappropriate for her to say 'If it had been that φ, it might have been that ¬ψ. ' is would constitute a pragmatic explanation of the data that suggest that Counterfactual Duality is valid.
Lewis anticipates this move. He tries to block it by arguing that such approaches have trouble explaining the reading of () on which it is false if there was no penny in my pocket-given that for all we know there was a penny in my pocket (, ).
()
If I had looked in my pocket, I might have found a penny.
In response, Stalnaker holds that the 'might' in () can be read "quasi-epistemically, "
relative to "what would be compatible with [my knowledge] if I knew all the relevant facts" (, ). Wherever the 'might' in () takes scope, if it is read quasiepistemically () is false in the situation Lewis describes. Prima facie, it might seem that quasi-epistemic 'might' counterfactuals would again collapse into 'would' counterfactuals, so that this move hasn't improved Stalnaker's position in the dialectic at all. But Stalnaker maintains a distinction between  these two kinds of counterfactuals by holding that If there is some indeterminacy in the language, there will still remain some different possibilities, even aer all the facts are in, and so [quasiepistemic] possibility will not collapse into truth. Propositions that are neither true nor false because of the indeterminacy will still be possibly true in this sense. () By allowing that a 'might' counterfactual is true when its quasi-epistemic 'might' takes scope at LF over an indeterminate 'would' counterfactual, Stalnaker arrives at an account of quasi-epistemic 'might' counterfactuals that is "very close to Lewis's.
It agrees with Lewis's account that If A, it might be that B is true if and only if If A it would be that not-B is not true" ()
. is principle is close enough to Counterfactual Duality to help explain why Counterfactual Duality seems valid. But it is not so close that endorsing it together with Conditional Excluded Middle would efface the distinction between 'would' and quasi-epistemic 'might' counterfactuals. Given that () is neither true nor false, and that 'might' in () in effect takes wide scope over (), the 'might' can pick up on ()'s indeterminacy and make the quasiepistemic reading of () true. By taking wide scope, the 'might' can target indeterminacy in the whole counterfactual (). If, contrary to Stalnaker, the 'might' stayed in situ, it would be able to target indeterminacy only in 'Verdi would have been French. ' Stalnaker makes a strong case that there is relevant indeterminacy in (); it is less plausible that there is relevant indeterminacy in ()'s consequent. Unfortunately, Stalnaker's treatment does not generalize. Sometimes the quasiepistemic 'might' of a true 'might' counterfactual cannot take wide scope over an indeterminate 'would' counterfactual without changing the meaning of the 'might' counterfactual. Here is an example. Suppose that if any two of Bizet, Verdi, and Wagner had been compatriots, it is indeterminate what country they would have called home. en the quasi-epistemic reading of () seems true.
()
If exactly two of Bizet, Verdi, and Wagner had been compatriots, every one of them might have been French.
But if the 'might' in () took wide scope, we would get the self-contradictory ().
 ()
It might be that if exactly two of Bizet, Verdi, and Wagner had been compatriots, every one of them would have been French.
On the other hand, if the 'might' in () stayed in situ there would be no indeterminate 'would' counterfactual in its scope. is analysis is to some degree reminiscent of Lewis's later suggestion that "perhaps" () has a " 'would-be-possible' " reading, as ():
() If Nixon had pressed the button, there might have been a quasi-miracle.
() If Nixon had pressed the button, it would be that: a quasi-miracle is possible.
But in that discussion Lewis is explicit that he means 'possible' to target not epistemic possibility but objective chance (, -). e analysis is still closer to those of G  and L , according to which indicative conditionals with overt modals in their consequents may also contain covert higher modals that are restricted by the conditional's antecedent. Indeed, Lewis's need to posit a covert modal in () broadens the base of support for views like Geurts's and Leslie's.
⁴ere is a similar problem for indicative conditionals: the presuppositions carried by 'every square inch of the mural' in 'If there is a mural on the oor, every square inch of the mural might have paint on it' do not project. So the entire consequent must scope below the antecedent. And although Stalnakerians might handle () by scoping 'every one of them might' over 'If exactly two of Bizet, Verdi, and Wagner had been compatriots, x would have been French, ' this strategy fails for 'If exactly two of Bizet, Verdi, and Wagner had been compatriots, every Francophile among them might have been French, ' because 'every Francophile among them' needs to be evaluated relative to antecedent worlds.
I have tried to make two broad points in this section. First, because a quanti er sometimes locks in situ the modal in the consequent of a conditional, we must think seriously about the semantics of conditionals that embed such modals. For example, Stalnaker must handle quasi-epistemic readings without wide-scoping. Second, if we endorse Kratzer's in uential hypothesis that conditionals are really just modals (, ), we must think seriously about modals that themselves embed epistemic modals, because the epistemic 'might' in () cannot take scope outside the conditional itself.
